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Since the invention of modern photography in 1839, the unremitting production of 
photographs filled the world not only with endless images, but also with innumerable 
photographic objects: postcards, limited edition prints, snapshots and studio portraits. This 
proliferation of the photographic object highlights a paradox: while the photographic image 
claims a privileged relationship with truth, an evidence that “that was then” (Barthes), the 
photograph as an object hints at the phantasmagoria of social relations encapsulated in the 
photograph as material commodity. The photographic object contains within itself traces of 
its social uses, it speaks of its history, of its owners and of the roles it was designed to 
perform.  
But what of the materiality of the digital image? For the question of photographic 
materiality – its political-cultural sociality – takes on a peculiar importance especially when 
one remembers that unlike its predecessor, the digital image is a matrix of digits, a 
mathematical equation, a binary sequence which can be recorded to disk, transmitted 
electronically as a stream of data and construed as a visual pattern by algorithms which 
control the way the image will appear on a display device.
1
 
Following this line of thought, the difference between an analogue and a digital 
photograph can be expressed as follows: An analogue photograph is both an object and an 
image. It is a reflection of the world, but it is also a trace of world, As Geoffrey Batchen 
observes: “unlike other systems of representation, the camera does more than just see the 
world; it is also touched by it.”
2
 In Peirceian semiotics, photographs belong to the class of 
“indexical” signs, identified by their physical connection with the object. In the case of 
photography, the fingerprint of the real is in the formation of the photographic image by the 
rays of light that are reflected from the photographed object. When the light strikes the light-
sensitive film inside the camera, it forms an image that is analogous to the object. This 
__________________________ 
1 T. Lenoir, “Introduction,” in Mark B.N. Hansen, New Philosophy for New Media, (London/Cambridge: The 
MIT Press: 2004), pp. xiii-xv. 
2 G. Batchen, “Ere the Substance Fade,” in E. Edwards & J. Hart (eds), Photographs Objects Histories, 
(London/New York, Routledge: 2004), p. 40. 
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analogue image is preserved through all subsequent copies from the original negative. The 
privileged position of the photograph as a purveyor of truth is based on the notion that, at 
least in part, it is an unmediated recording of the object in front of the camera. Roland 
Barthes described this quality of the photograph as a “message without a code”, suggesting 
that the there is an uninterrupted continuity between the world and the photographic image, 
which does away with the need to interpret or decode the photograph.
3
  This is a privileged 
position indeed – no other image can claim to be a direct imprint of the real, and it goes a 
long way to explain the unique status of photography both as a medium for recording 
memories (for the masses) and as tool of surveillance (for the rulers)
4
. 
The formulation of photography as an “image without a code” belongs to the historic 
period of chemical photography, and accurately captures the essence photography’s claim for 
truth. But as we move into the digital age, this special relationship between photography and 
the real appears to be broken. Sensors that convert the intensity and the colour of light to 
numeric values record the digital photographic image. While the analogue image is a direct 
and continuous recording of the object, the digital image is made of discrete picture elements 
(pixels) that encode light intensity as binary digits. The digital image is therefore nothing else 
but mathematical code that can be stored, manipulated and transmitted by computers. By 
following the logic of specific algorithms, it can be displayed on a monitor or output to a 
digital printer. Visually, the analogue photograph can be similar, even indistinguishable, from 
the digital image, but the former is fossilised time, a slice of the past preserved, while the 
latter is a stream of binary data which can be manipulated, edited, rearranged and 
reconfigured thus breaking photography’s link with the real.
5
 
In contrast to the digital image that is being stored as a string of binary numbers, the 
pre-digital, analogue photograph is not only an image, but also an object: a physical and 
manufactured thing. As an object, a photograph has presence, it belongs to history. The 
markings left on the photograph by the hands that handled it are an evidence of uniqueness 
and authenticity.
6
  The material qualities of the photograph can be as meaningful and 
informative as the image. To take one example, the small size of the photographic snapshot 
suggests certain intimacy between the viewer and the image, this proximity is further 
__________________________ 
3 R. Barthes, Image music text, (London: Fontana Press: 1997), p. 17. 
4 S. Sontag, On Photography, (London: Penguin Books: 1979), p. 178 
5 W.J. Mitchell, The reconfigured eye,  (Cambridge: MIT Press: 1992), pp. 1-17 
6 N. Vestberg, “Archival Value; on photography, materiality and indexicality,” in Photogrphies Vol. 1, no. 1, 
2008, pp. 49-65.  (London: Routledge) 
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reinforced when the snapshot is placed in a family album – the size of which suggests mutual, 
shared viewing. The back of the snapshot can sometimes carry handwritten inscriptions with 
the date, the location and the names of the people involved. Taken as a whole, the snapshot 




As Joanna Sassoon observed in “Photographic materiality in the age of digital 
reproduction”: 
[It is]appropriate to consider a photograph as a multi-layered laminated object in which 
meaning is derived from a symbiotic relationship between materiality, content and 
context.8 
That is the case with an analogue photograph, but where will one locate the 
materiality of the digital image? For it seems to have no material presence at all. Or, if it 
does, it is to be found in the algorithms which control the appearance of the image on the 
screen, in the fibre-optic cables which carry signals across networks, in the metal, plastic and 
polymers which computers are made of.
9
  All that seems very different from the experience 
of holding a photographic print in one’s hands, feeling the surface of the print, turning it 
around to reveal a faded inscription in an old fashioned handwriting.  
In addition to appearing dematerialised, fragmented and mathematical in origin, the 
digital image seems to be lacking the physical and tactile qualities, which contribute to the 
highly fetishised status of traditional photographs. With this in mind, it would be instructive 
to ask what is the response of contemporary artists to the apparent dematerialisation of 
photography that occurs with the transition from the analogue to the digital image. By turning 
to photographic works made with digital technologies, I am changing the question from 
“what is digital photography?” to “what can it do?” This is of course a significant shift in 
focus:  from a Platonic search after the essence of the thing, to the functional enquiry about 
the way in which the thing manifests itself in the world. But as I am questioning after the 
materiality of the digital image, this shift is justified, if not essential. For as long as we are 
concerned with essences and ideal forms, the material, the physical and the corporeal will 
appear as of lesser significance than the operating principle. 
__________________________ 
7  E. Edwards E. & Hart J. Photographs Objects Histories. pp. 1-15 
8 J. Sassoon. Photographic materiality in the age of digital reproduction. in  E. Edwards &  J. Hart (eds), 
Photographs Objects Histories, (London/New York, Routledge: 2004), p 189 
9 M. Manoff,  “The Materiality of digital collections: Theoretical and historical perspectives,” in Portal: 
Libraries and the Academy, Vol. 6, No 3, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), pp. 311-325. 
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But before we turn to two recent examples of the ways in which materiality enters the 
discourse of digital photography, I want to consider briefly one historical image which I hope 
will help to demonstrate that questions of materiality were of concern to photographers since 
the early days of the medium. 
+),#%∃)(−.∗∀%#/∗
 
Hippolyte Bayard: Self-portrait as a drowned man. 1840 
In 1840, Hippolyte Bayard made what is probably the earliest example of a 
photographic self-portrait. Titled “Self Portrait as a Drowned Man”, it was created one year 
after the invention of photography. Bayard, one of photography’s pioneers, is often 
considered to be the first photographer to use the medium for artistic, rather than scientific or 
commercial ends. 
The image and its caption (Self Portrait as a Drowned Man) comprise a multi-layered 
meditation on the complex relationship of photography with truth and death: the title engages 
with the truthfulness of photographic representation by admitting that the corpse is a fake. 
(The relationship between the caption and the image is based on the Cretan paradox, the self 
cancelling statement ‘I am a liar’ – in Bayard’s case ‘I am dead’) 
Bayard is simultaneously inside and outside the image: he is at one and the same time 
the (dead) subject, the author and the narrator. The title of the image takes issue with 
photography’s ability to show the truth by presenting us with a simulacrum and drawing 
attention to the manipulative and deceptive possibilities of the medium while at the same 
time relying on photography’s inherent ability to reproduce reality in convincing detail. 
In addition to the play of presence and absence created by the juxtaposition of the title 
with the image, there is a handwritten note on the back of this photograph which negates the 
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artifice of the image and directs attention at the same time to the illusion of the dead body 
and the reality of the photograph as object: 
“The corpse which you see here is that of M Bayard, inventor of the process that you 
have just seen, […]he has been at the morgue for several days and no-one has 
recognized or claimed him. Ladies and Gentlemen, you’d better pass along for a fear of 
offending your sense of smell, for as you can observe, the face and the hands of the 
gentleman are beginning to decay. – H.B. 18 October 1840.”10 
In Bayard’s photograph the photographic and the corporeal are linked in multiple 
ways – the corpse of the artist in the picture is a simulacrum, it is a make believe, but the text 
on the back of the image draws the attention of the viewer simultaneously to the realism and 
the artifice of the image: the dark patches of skin on the hands and the face are visible 
evidence of the ‘decay’; the body is perceived as a surface that can be inscribed with 





10 G. Batchen, Burning with Desire, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), pp. 167-171 
 
11 For a detailed account of this image see: Batchen, 1999 
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Alexa Wright: Archaeology of the Self. 1997 
 
In the series “Archaeology of the Self” Alexa Wright embeds pictures of fossils onto 
the body. According to artist’s own statement: 
 “In this work the body is represented as ambiguous, androgynous, sculptural and 
monumental. Alluding to both geological formation and artefact, these images 
contemplate natural/cultural constructions of self. Fossils, resembling tattoos, are 
depicted embedded in the back to explore ideas of the body as a territory partly formed 
and occupied by its own (cultural) history and partly consciously controlled.”12 
Here, similarly to Bayard’s “Self-portrait as a drowned man”, the human body is the 
site of artistic intervention. For Wright as well as for Bayard human skin is a sensitive surface 
that can be inscribed with messages through the agency of photography. This performative 
quality of the photographic act is emphasised by drawing attention away from the photograph 
and directing it towards the body which functions as the site of the performance and as its 
subject. The similarity between the body and the photograph is further reinforced by the 
rhetoric of an image within an image: the image (of decay in Bayard, of a fossil in Wright) is 
framed by the body that is in turn framed by the photograph.  
And yet, there is a significant difference between the body/image relationship in the 
work of Bayard and Wright. The process of digital manipulation that inscribes the fossil onto 
the skin and marks the body in a way that appears indistinguishable from real, physical scars, 
suggests not only that there are continuities between our own bodies and the environment we 
inhabit, but also that there are no clear boundaries between ourselves and digital images. In 
__________________________ 
12 http://www.alteregoinstallation.co.uk/main_site/aofspg.html accessed 06.08.08 
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“Archaeology of the Self” the body is both the object of manipulation and the canvas on 
which the results of digital manipulation are displayed – the fossil is framed by the body, 
suggesting that the body is the surface of the image, drawing a parallel between the human 
skin and the computer screen. This work can be read in the context of Katherine Hayles’ 
unpacking of the myth of disembodiment in cultural theory: 
The body’s dematerialization depends in complex and highly specific ways on the 
embodied circumstances that and ideology of dematerialization would obscure. 
Excavating these connections requires a way of talking about the body responsive to its 
construction as discourse/information and yet not trapped within it.13 
“Archaeology of the Self” fits within the logic of embodiment as outlined by Hayles: 
These images present us simultaneously with the simulacrum of representation and with the 
materiality that produces it. In this context the distinction between the real and the artificial is 
a discursive and cultural one, not determined by technology alone. 
01/∗4∋/,#)%∀∗%5∗!&/∀#)#3∗∗
 
Wendy McMurdo: Helen, Backstage, Merlin Theatre (the Glance), 1995 
The work of Wendy McMurdo concerned with the relationship between the digital 
and the uncanny. For the project “Doppelganger” she employed traditional photography and 
computer technology to produce images of children who seem slightly “out of this world”, 
situated as it were between fact and fiction. In this series, each child is digitally “doubled” so 
__________________________ 
13 N. Katherine Hayles,  How we became posthuman, (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1999), p. 193 
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the two – the real and the copy, occupy the same space. This work of Wendy McMurdo is 
often discussed as an attempt to explore the inaccessible world of children, and as a 
suggestion that there is a dark side to the popular narratives of childhood.
14
 But in the context 
of present discussion, it seems to me that there is another concern in her work that is directly 
related to the question of materiality of the digital image.  
At first sight, this is a photograph of identical twins identically dressed. The subtitle 
of the series “the digital and the uncanny” suggests that the photograph is of a real child and 
her digital double. The image is offering us an opportunity to examine the link between the 
real and the digital and asks after the relationship between them. 
On the most basic level we are presented with a meditation on the question of 
identity: the identity of twins is at the same time an enquiry after the identity of the digital 
technology that makes twining possible. And while we are looking at the real person and a 
copy, we are also confronted with photography’s claim for truthful recording of the real, so 
the identity of photography is being questioned too. 
If we remain at this level of understanding we risk missing the opportunity to follow 
the path beyond the binary opposites of “original” and “copy”. Moving past the notion of 
identity, we are confronted with more complex claim that makes us question the significance 
of the apparent similarity between the original and the copy. My reading of this aspect of the 
image is based on Heidegger’s “Identity and difference”, in which he states that the question 
of identity is “the oldest, and still the most troubling question in the history of Western 
thought”.
15
 The work of McMurdo provides a way of exploring the significance of that 
question. At first sight, the analogue and the digital girls are identical (twins), we might 
therefore be tempted to conclude that A=A. Or, as Hegel puts it in the Preface to “Philosophy 
of Law”: “The real is the rational and the rational is the real”
16
. Or, going back to image in 
hand: the digital child is a fateful copy of the real child. But if this is our reading of the 
image, we are still in the realm of representation; we are still upholding the rational digital 
image as a perfect copy of the analogue.  
 
There is something disturbing in this photograph of the twins; something, which 
keeps reaching out to us, suggesting that we did not go far enough, that there, is more to this 
__________________________ 
14 See for example: http://www.iniva.org/dare/themes/play/mcmurdo.html accessed 07.08.08 
15 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, (New York: Harper & Row: 1969) p. 23 
16 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right. Translated by S. W. Dyde  (New York, Dover Publications 2005), p. xix 
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question of identity. So we go back to the image, to notice that the real and the digital do not 
match; one is not an accurate copy of the other. At last we are drawn to the differences 
between the two. The question of identity acquires a new meaning; as we are noticing the 
differences, we become occupied with the image in a new way – now we are comparing the 
two girls and seeking out the dissimilar, not the identical. The differences between the real 
person and her digital double are only visible to us, the viewer, and through acknowledging 
this difference, we become essential to the meaning of the image. In other words, our 
attention is drawn to the relationship, to the being together of the digital and the analogue. 
This relationship, which is available in all its richness to the observer who can contemplate 
both sides at the same time, precedes both the digital and the analogue, being more original 
then they
17
. So instead of A=A, what we have now is A is A. This is, third person singular 
present of the verb to be directs us to think about being, the being for whom the relationship 
between A and A reveals itself.  
At the end of this dialogue with the image we arrive at the realisation that for any 
meaning to emerge there has to be a being to whom the image speaks. In other words, when 
we say that A = A, (real and digital are the same) we pose an equation based on the premise 
of mathematical objectivity. This is an idealistic position. The underlying concept of Idealism 
is that the law of identity is an axiom, an objective, mathematical truth. But when we are 
saying A is A we are saying that A is experienced as A by us as belonging to A. As Joanna 
Drucker observes:  
[…] when empirical and/or positivist logic invades culture to such an extreme that 
representation appears to present a unitary truth in a totalizing model of thought, then 
that leaves little or no room for the critical action or agency that are essential to any 
political action or criticism.18  
The work of Wendy McMurdo points to a fundamental flaw in the argument that 
claims complete identity between the digital image and the notion of disembodied, 
dematerialised information. McMurdo’s work seems to suggest the opposite – that there is no 
information without representation, that information cannot exist on its own, without agency, 
without specific material conditions, such as the empty theatre where the meeting between 
the girl and her digital twin takes place. 
 
__________________________ 
17 Identity and Difference, p. 26 
18 J. Drucker “Digital Ontologies: The ideality of form in/and code storage–or–can graphesis challenge 
mathesis?” in Leonardo Electronic Almanac, 34 No. 2. 
(http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/leonardo/v034/34.2drucker.html)p.142  
Daniel Rubinstein, “Digitally yours; The body in Contemporary Photography”, 
The Issues (in Contemporary Culture and Aesthetics) (2,3) 2009. 
 
  10 
6%∀(.∋,)%∀∗
As we saw in Bayard’s “Self-portrait as a Drowned Man”, questions of materiality are 
part of photography’s rhetoric since its invention. But these concerns undergo a 
transformation in the digital age. For Alexa Wright and Wendy McMurdo materiality of the 
digital image is linked to the notion of the co-presence of the human and the digital. 
In Alexa Wright’s work the digital is embodied in the corporeal – the digital image is 
mediated through the body, which is both the site of the digital manipulation and the medium 
through which the image comes into being.  
The work of Wendy McMurdo problematises the notion of the dematerialised digital 
image, suggesting that it is not defined by the absence of materiality, but on the contrary, by 
the presence of the observer who evaluates the differences and the similarities between the 
original and the digital double. The digital and the analogue are not the same – there is a 
sense of imperfect match, the digital is not an identical twin. The work points to the 
differences, the mismatches, the absence of identity, and in doing so involves the viewer as a 
mediator between the two sides of the image. Difference, not identity, appears to be the 
commanding rule of digitality. Instead of appealing to mathematical principles, this image 
suggests that meaning cannot be obtained without human agency. 
While the traditional photograph can sit on the mantelpiece or hang on the wall, 
ostensibly carrying an independent existence of an object in the world, the digital image does 
not have this level of autonomy from human presence. Lev Manovich pointed out that digital 
images depend for their existence on user’s active involvement – from switching on the 
computer and ensuring a constant supply of electricity, to proceeding to treat the images 
according to the logic of hypertext – looking for links, image maps and hidden features, 
zooming in and out and resizing.
19
 
In “New Philosophy for new Media”, Mark Hansen argues that the involvement with 
the image does not stop at the level of interaction delineated by Manovich; he proposes that 
contemporary digital art underwent a paradigm shift in the very basis of aesthetic culture: it is 
a shift from the dominant ocularcentric aesthetic to the tactile, haptic aesthetic rooted in the 






19 L. Manovich, The language of new media. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass 2001. p. 183 
20 Hansen, 2004.pp. 9-10 
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The idea that digital images are performed, rather than viewed, is significant as it 
moves away from thinking about photographs as objects, and instead viewing them as 
processes. This echoes a suggestion made by Raymond Williams in “Problems of 
Materialism and Culture”, where he says: 
“[…] I think the true crisis in cultural theory, in our own time, is between this view of 
the work of art as object and the alternative view of art as a practice.”21 
This is not only a call to privilege the mode of production over consumption; it is also 
a suggestion that works of art have no singular existence:  
 “There is no Fifth Symphony, there is no work in the whole area of music and dance and 
performance, which is an object in any way comparable to the works in the visual arts 
which have survived.”22  
It appears that for the photographers we looked at here, the triumph of digitality 
demands a re-evaluation of the role of materiality in the discourse of photography. Close 
examination of their work reveals that in the digital age, materiality still plays an important 
role in the making of photographic meaning. In fact it could be said, that in the digital age, 
more than ever before, materiality is the message. 
__________________________ 
21 Raymond Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture. Verso, London. New York, 1980. p. 47. 
22 Ibid. 
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